Patronage and Political Stability in Africa

Political conflict across Africa is often linked to the pervasive use of patronage in retaining control of the state. However, few sources of data have been available to systematically examine the relationship between a leader’s patronage strategies and the likelihood of an extraconstitutional chang...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Comparative political studies 2009-10, Vol.42 (10), p.1339-1362
Main Author: Arriola, Leonardo R.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Africa
Appointment
Cabinet
Cabinet government
Cabinets
Coalitions
Conflict
Coup d'Etat
Coups d'etat
Cross-national analysis
Economic Development
Economic growth
Patronage
Political appointments
Political control
Political leadership
Political Power
Political stability
Power
Risk
Stability
Strategic behaviour
Tenure
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Summary:Political conflict across Africa is often linked to the pervasive use of patronage in retaining control of the state. However, few sources of data have been available to systematically examine the relationship between a leader’s patronage strategies and the likelihood of an extraconstitutional change in power. This article employs ministerial appointments to the cabinet as a proxy for changes in the size of a leader’s patronage coalition. With time-series cross-section data on 40 African countries, this study shows that the size of cabinets varies systematically according to regime type, resource constraints, ethnic fractionalization, and total population. It then shows that African leaders extend their tenure in office by expanding their patronage coalition through cabinet appointments. A proportional hazards model of regime duration indicates that cabinet expansion lowers the probability of a leader’s being deposed through a coup. The appointment of one additional minister to the cabinet lowers a leader’s coup risk by a greater extent than does a 1-percentage-point increase in economic growth.
ISSN:0010-4140
1552-3829
DOI:10.1177/0010414009332126