On the Evolutionary Origin of Prospect Theory Preferences

Prospect theory scholars have identified important human decision-making biases, but they have been conspicuously silent on the question of the origin of these biases. Here we create a model that shows preferences consistent with prospect theory may have an origin in evolutionary psychology. Specifi...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Journal of politics 2008-04, Vol.70 (2), p.335-350
Main Authors: McDermott, Rose, Fowler, James H., Smirnov, Oleg
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Bargaining
Bias
Conflict
Decision Making
Economic development
Economic models
Economic reform
Economic theory
Evolution
Evolutionary psychology
Evolutionary Theories
Foraging
Humans
Politicians
Politics
Preferences
Prospect theory
Prospecting
Risk
Risk assessment
Risk aversion
Risk aversion preference
Survival
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:Prospect theory scholars have identified important human decision-making biases, but they have been conspicuously silent on the question of the origin of these biases. Here we create a model that shows preferences consistent with prospect theory may have an origin in evolutionary psychology. Specifically, we derive a model from risk-sensitive optimal foraging theory to generate an explanation for the origin and function of context-dependent risk aversion and risk-seeking behavior. Although this model suggests that human cognitive architecture evolved to solve particular adaptive problems related to finding sufficient food resources to survive, we argue that this same architecture persists and is utilized in other survival-related decisions that are critical to understanding political outcomes. In particular, we identify important departures from standard results when we incorporate prospect theory into theories of spatial voting and legislator behavior, international bargaining and conflict, and economic development and reform.
ISSN:0022-3816
1468-2508
DOI:10.1017/S0022381608080341