Agreeing to Disagree: Domestic Institutional Congruence and U.S. Dispute Behavior

Domestic and international politics are linked so that domestic structure and domestic political preferences affect international conflict behavior. In particular, states' policy preferences can be characterized by the congruence of policy preferences between political institutions. As a state&...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Political research quarterly 2000-06, Vol.53 (2), p.375-400
Main Author: Clark, David H.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Conflict resolution
Conflict theory
Domestic affairs
Foreign Policy
International agreements
International Conflict
International conflicts
International politics
International relations
Legislative Bodies
Politics
Presidents
U.S.A
United States of America
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Summary:Domestic and international politics are linked so that domestic structure and domestic political preferences affect international conflict behavior. In particular, states' policy preferences can be characterized by the congruence of policy preferences between political institutions. As a state's policy preferences become more congruent, as policy preferences between political institutions are more similar, the state's conflict behavior changes. I hypothesize that as the domestic political institutions in a state share similar policy preferences or policy goals, disputes become more likely and tend to last longer. I employ event count and continuous-time hazard models to analyze U.S. conflict propensity and conflict duration during the period 1945-1992. Using the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set (version 2.1), I model U.S. militarized dispute behavior as a function of congruence between the policy preferences of the U.S. President and the Congress. The models reveal a strong relationship between preference congruence and both the amount of conflict and the duration of the disputes in which the U.S. engages. The congruence hypotheses are robust across a variety of measures. The results add substantial strength and substance to claims that domestic political characteristics affect international conflict. The theory and empirical analyses also refine the domestic-international linkage by allowing scholars to consider the effect of normal political change in a single state on that state's foreign policy decisions.
ISSN:1065-9129
1938-274X
DOI:10.1177/106591290005300208