Remember Afghanistan?: A Glass Half Full, on the Titanic

• Published in: World policy journal 2006-03, Vol.23 (1), p.17-24
• Main Author: Robichaud, Carl
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Afghanistan; Afghanistan, Economic conditions; Afghanistan, Politics and government; Analysis; Control; Counterinsurgency; Current affairs; Economic assistance; Economic assistance, Afghanistan; Economic Development; Foreign Aid; Funding; General Interest; Governance; Government; Government and politics; Insurgency; Insurgency, Afghanistan; Internal security; Internal security, Afghanistan; International organizations; International Relations; Intervention (International law); Legitimacy of governments; Military operations; Militias; Nation building; National security; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Armed Forces; Opium trade, Afghanistan; Pakistan, Foreign relations, Afghanistan; Politics; Public Policy; Repatriation; Security; Stability; Sustainable agriculture; Sustainable economic development; Taliban (Afghanistan); Terrorism; U.S., Foreign relations, Afghanistan; United States
• ISSN: 0740-2775; 1936-0924
• DOI: 10.1215/07402775-2006-2002

Argues that Afghanistan's precarious teeter on the edge of collapse is attributed to the minimalist approach characterizing the international community's intervention since the fall of the Taliban. The importance of security for an Afghani government that must do without substantial foreign assistance is stressed. Attention is given to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force conducting peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan & Pakistani support for the insurgency. A lack of economic assistance is seen to have undermined efforts to defeat the ongoing insurgency; although donors have pledged billions, an absence of implementation has fueled the insurgency as well as the narco-economy. In addition, the government's lack of legitimacy enables the insurgency. It is argued that the Afghanistan Compact, which sets benchmarks & responsibilities for security, governance, & economic development, is the last best chance to achieve sustainable structures in Afghanistan. Preventing Afghanistan from falling into chaos requires that the US & other donors recognize (1) NATO forces are necessary but not sufficient; (2) governance & economic development cannot be subordinated to security; (3) a war on drugs must be avoided; (4) international efforts to establish the rule of war must be redoubled; & (5) greater diplomatic efforts must be made to convince Pakistan to withdraw support for the Taliban. D. Edelman