Venezuela: Crowding Out the Opposition

The acceleration of authoritarianism in Venezuela since 2004, together with Hugo Chávez's reelection in 2006, cannot be explained easily with functional theories. Instead, we focus on political opportunities: specifically, economic resources at the state's disposal together with weakened i...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of democracy 2007-04, Vol.18 (2), p.99-113
Main Authors: Corrales, Javier, Penfold-Becerra, Michael
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Authoritarianism
Authoritarianism (Political Ideology)
Chavez, Hugo
Competition
Corruption
Democracy
Economic Factors
Economic growth
Elections
Expenditures
Government employees
Heads of state
Ideology
Legislation
Legislative Bodies
Longitudinal studies
Lower chamber
Majorities
Military promotions
Political conditions
Political parties
Political regimes
Politics
Presidents
Telecommunications policy
Venezuela
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Summary:The acceleration of authoritarianism in Venezuela since 2004, together with Hugo Chávez's reelection in 2006, cannot be explained easily with functional theories. Instead, we focus on political opportunities: specifically, economic resources at the state's disposal together with weakened institutions of representation helped crowd out the opposition. We show how clientelism and electoral authoritarianism feed each other. Together with deliberate strategies of polarization, impunity, and job discrimination, lavish spending has allowed the state to mobilize majorities and emerge undefeatable at the polls. This invincibility is, paradoxically, the reason that the Venezuelan state has become an unreliable force for promoting democracy.
ISSN:1045-5736
1086-3214
1086-3214
DOI:10.1353/jod.2007.0020