Agenda Control, Majority Party Power, and the House Committee on Rules, 1937-52

The role of the U.S. House Rules Committee is consequential for theories of congressional parties, yet its role during the "conservative coalition" era is not well understood. We systematically analyzed the politics surrounding all special rules considered in Democratic Congresses from 193...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Legislative studies quarterly 2009-11, Vol.34 (4), p.455-491
Main Authors: SCHICKLER, ERIC, PEARSON, KATHRYN
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Committees
Congressional committees
Congressional voting
Conservatism
Government initiatives
Legislative Bodies
Liberalism
Majorities
New Deal
Political parties
Political Power
Roll call votes
Veto
Voting
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Summary:The role of the U.S. House Rules Committee is consequential for theories of congressional parties, yet its role during the "conservative coalition" era is not well understood. We systematically analyzed the politics surrounding all special rules considered in Democratic Congresses from 1937 to 1952. We found that Rules repeatedly used its agenda power to push to the floor conservative initiatives that were opposed by the Democratic administration, the Rules Committee chair, and most northern Democrats, especially in Congresses that followed Republican election gains. The 44 conservative initiatives we identified include many of the most important policy issues considered during the period. Our findings challenge the idea that the majority party has consistently enjoyed a veto over which initiatives reach the floor, and they underscore the limits of roll-call-vote analysis in assessments of agenda control.
ISSN:0362-9805
1939-9162
DOI:10.3162/036298009789869718