The Institutional Features of the Prisoners of War Treaties

• Published in: International organization 2001-10, Vol.55 (4), p.971-991
• Main Author: Morrow, James D.
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: 20th century; Agreements; Armies; Design; Enforcement; Equilibrium; Flexibility; Human rights; Institutions; International; International agreements; International Law; International organizations; International relations; Law of war; Nazism; Noise; Pareto optimum; Prisoner treatment; Prisoners of War; Prisoners of war & missing in action; Rational Choice; Soldiers; Studies; Surrender; The Rational Design of International Institutions; Treaties; Violations; War; World wars
• ISSN: 0020-8183; 1531-5088
• DOI: 10.1162/002081801317193664

During the twentieth century states negotiated and ratified formal treaties on the treatment of prisoners of war (POWs). These treaties have created a system for the treatment of POWs with universal and detailed standards and decentralized enforcement. I explain the form of the POW system as a rational institutional response to four strategic problems the issue of POWs poses: monitoring under noise, individual as opposed to state violations, variation in preferred treatment of POWs, and raising a mass army. In response to these four problems, neutral parties help address the problem of monitoring the standards. The ratification process screens out some states that do not intend to live up to the standards. The two-level problem of state and individual violations is addressed by making states responsible for punishing the actions of their own soldiers. By protecting POWs, the treaties help states raise armies during wartime. The POW case supports many, but not all, of the Rational Design conjectures. In particular, it suggests other strategic logics to explain variation in the membership and centralization of international institutions.