Veto Players and Institutional Analysis

The veto players theory can be used to analyze all political systems regardless of regime (presidential or parliamentary), party system (one‐, two‐, or multiparty), and type of parliament (unicameral or multicameral). This paper develops the veto players theory to account for a series of important p...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Governance (Oxford) 2000-10, Vol.13 (4), p.441-474
Main Author: Tsebelis, George
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Game Theory
Political institutions
Political regimes
Political Science Theories
Political Systems
Politics
Veto
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Summary:The veto players theory can be used to analyze all political systems regardless of regime (presidential or parliamentary), party system (one‐, two‐, or multiparty), and type of parliament (unicameral or multicameral). This paper develops the veto players theory to account for a series of important political phenomena: the difference between majoritarian and supermajoritarian institutions; the importance of absenteeism, or of political marginalization; the importance of agenda control and referendums; the reasons for government stability (parliamentary systems) and regime stability (presidential systems); the reasons for independence of bureaucracies, and judicial independence. All these phenomena are analyzed in a coherent way, on the basis of the same framework. Empirical evidence from existing literature corroborating the theory is provided.
ISSN:0952-1895
1468-0491
DOI:10.1111/0952-1895.00141