The Relationship Between Independence and Judicial Review in Post-Communist Courts

Following the collapse of communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, constitutional designers codified rules establishing independent judiciaries. To what degree do these constitutional and statutory guarantees of independence reflect the actual behavior of courts? Our...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Journal of politics 2003-05, Vol.65 (2), p.422-438
Main Authors: Herron, Erik S., Randazzo, Kirk A.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Civil liberties
Courts
Economic conditions
Executive branch
Independence
Judges
Judicial Review
Judicial reviews
Judicial system
Judiciary
Legislation
Litigants
Political Factors
Political power
Political systems
Postcommunism
Postcommunist Societies
Separation of Powers
Socioeconomic Factors
Statutory law
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Summary:Following the collapse of communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, constitutional designers codified rules establishing independent judiciaries. To what degree do these constitutional and statutory guarantees of independence reflect the actual behavior of courts? Our analysis demonstrates that official judicial power does not predict expressions of judicial review—overturning legislation in whole or in part. Rather, exogenous factors, including economic conditions, executive power, identity of the litigants and legal issues, influence the likelihood that courts will nullify laws. Our findings should caution both scholars and institutional designers. Both formal and informal factors create the parameters in which courts operate. Although courts have become more powerful institutions in the post-communist era, they face a diverse set of constraints on independent action.
ISSN:0022-3816
1468-2508
DOI:10.1111/1468-2508.t01-3-00007