Term Limits as a Response to Incumbency Advantage

In this paper we develop a spatial model to provide an explanation for the seeming paradox that voters in some states reelect incumbents while unilaterally self-imposing legislative term limits. The model shows that voters are more likely to support term limits if the incumbent's position is fa...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Journal of politics 2005-05, Vol.67 (2), p.390-406
Main Authors: Chen, Kong-Pin, Niou, Emerson M. S.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Candidates
Incumbency
Incumbents
Legislators
Paradoxes
Platform
Political candidates
Political debate
Political elections
Political parties
Politicians
Public officials
Public policy
Referendums
Term limitations
Term Limits
United States of America
Voters
Voting
Voting Behavior
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Summary:In this paper we develop a spatial model to provide an explanation for the seeming paradox that voters in some states reelect incumbents while unilaterally self-imposing legislative term limits. The model shows that voters are more likely to support term limits if the incumbent's position is farther from the median voter position or if the incumbent's party is more moderate. Furthermore, it suggests that term limits, or the threat of term limits, increases the responsiveness of politicians' policy platforms.
ISSN:0022-3816
1468-2508
DOI:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00322.x