Judicial Independence in Unstable Environments, Argentina 1935-1998

Argentina's constitution and electoral rules promote a fragmented polity. It is in those environments that independent judiciaries develop. Instead, most analysts do not consider the Argentina judiciary as independent. In this article we attempt to explain this contradiction by showing that thi...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:American journal of political science 2002-10, Vol.46 (4), p.699-716
Main Authors: Iaryczower, Matías, Spiller, Pablo T., Tommasi, Mariano
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Argentina
Coefficients
Congressional voting
Constitutional history
Constitutions
Decision making
Decisions
Impeachment
Intergovernmental Relations
Judges
Judicial Decisions
Judicial power
Judicial system
Judiciary
Legislature
Parliamentary government
Political attitudes
Political power
Political questions and judicial power
Political science
Separation of Powers
Solicitors general
Supreme Court
Supreme Court justices
Supreme Courts
Upper houses
Voting
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Summary:Argentina's constitution and electoral rules promote a fragmented polity. It is in those environments that independent judiciaries develop. Instead, most analysts do not consider the Argentina judiciary as independent. In this article we attempt to explain this contradiction by showing that this perception is inappropriate. We develop a test of the hypothesis that the judiciary is independent by empirically examining the political incentives faced by individual justices in their decision making. Our results show an often-defiant Court subject to constraints. Our measure of defiance is the probability of a nonaligned justice voting against the government. We find that judicial decision making was strategic. The probability of voting against the government falls the stronger the control of the president over the legislature, but increases the less aligned the justice is with the president. Thus, politics and process matter in understanding Argentina's Supreme Court decisions. Institutions matter in Argentina as well.
ISSN:0092-5853
1540-5907
DOI:10.2307/3088428