Political Competition and Pork-Barrel Politics in the Allocation of Public Investment in Mexico

This paper examines the effect of political competition in local elections in regional allocation of public investment. The study employs data on Mexican elections covering the period 1990-95, characterised by an increase in electoral competition and coupled with increasing demands for decentralisat...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Public choice 2003-07, Vol.116 (1/2), p.185-204
Main Authors: Costa-I-Font, Joan, Rodriguez-Oreggia, Eduardo, Lunapla, Dario
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Central Government
Coefficients
Competition
Decentralization
Democracy
Economic competition
Economic theory
Economics
Election results
Elections
Expenditures
Federal government
Government
Government Spending
Hypotheses
Incumbents
Local elections
Local government
Local Politics
Mexico
Opposition parties
Political behavior
Political elections
Political parties
Politics
Pork
Public choice
Public finance
Public investment
Public investments
Regions
State elections
Studies
Voters
Voting
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Summary:This paper examines the effect of political competition in local elections in regional allocation of public investment. The study employs data on Mexican elections covering the period 1990-95, characterised by an increase in electoral competition and coupled with increasing demands for decentralisation throughout the states. Empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that regional allocation of public investment by central government was driven by 'political opportunism' and 'local pork-barrel politics'. A positive relationship was found between the regional allocation of public investment and support for the central ruling party. This might indicate that local spending inefficiencies were partially explained by the specific support for the incumbent party.
ISSN:0048-5829
1573-7101
DOI:10.1023/A:1024263208736