Public Administration, Science, and Risk Assessment: A Case Study of the U.K. Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Crisis

The bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak in the United Kingdom is regarded as one of the worst public policy crises the British government has experienced during the postwar era. In material terms, it has led to the slaughter of 3.3 million cattle and estimated economic losses of £3.7 bil...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Public administration review 2005-07, Vol.65 (4), p.396-408
Main Authors: Beck, Matthias, Asenova, Darinka, Dickson, Gordon
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Administrative centralization
Agricultural policy
Beef
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy
Case studies
Cattle
Communication
Communication (Thought Transfer)
Creutzfeldt Jakob syndrome
Cross Cultural Studies
Decision making
Definitions
Diseases
Environmental policy
Evidence
Food Industry
Government (Administrative Body)
Government Agencies
Government crises
Government officials
Interest groups
Knowledge Level
Lead Article
Meats
Networks
Nuclear accidents & safety
Organizational Effectiveness
Policy analysis
Policy making
Political alliances
Political crises
Public administration
Public Agencies
Public Health
Public officials
Public Opinion
Public policy
Risk analysis
Risk Assessment
Risk management
Science
Social Environment
Studies
Ungulates
United Kingdom
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Summary:The bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak in the United Kingdom is regarded as one of the worst public policy crises the British government has experienced during the postwar era. In material terms, it has led to the slaughter of 3.3 million cattle and estimated economic losses of £3.7 billion. In administrative terms, the crisis brought about the dissolution of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. This article examines the institutional context in which decisions about the scientific evidence on BSE were made. The authors argue that a centralized system in which government agencies control science for government is inherently vulnerable to alliances of experts and interest groups that undermine the credible assessment of public health and safety risks. Specific societal conditions may encourage risk-opportunistic behavior among policy makers that is conducive to delays and inaction until such time as the evidence of a health risk becomes overwhelming.
ISSN:0033-3352
1540-6210
DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2005.00467.x