Organized Interests and the Politics of Federal Discretionary Grants

Despite their importance in theories of distributive spending, interest groups and other private and public organizations are largely absent from empirical research on the allocation of federal spending to subnational jurisdictions. We find that organized interests are significant determinants of th...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Journal of politics 2004-05, Vol.66 (2), p.513-533
Main Authors: Lowry, Robert C., Potoski, Matthew
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Agricultural policy
Agriculture
Coefficients
Commerce
Environmental policy
Federal Government
Government grants
Government Spending
Grants
Interest Groups
Political partisanship
Political theory
Tax exempt organizations
United States of America
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Summary:Despite their importance in theories of distributive spending, interest groups and other private and public organizations are largely absent from empirical research on the allocation of federal spending to subnational jurisdictions. We find that organized interests are significant determinants of the allocation of federal discretionary grants to states for 1991 through 1998 across seven policy areas. In contrast, we find only meager effects for supply-side variables suggested by the literature. We conjecture that supply-side effects are highly contingent on political circumstances and the type of spending being analyzed.
ISSN:0022-3816
1468-2508
DOI:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2004.00162.x