A Theoretical Basis for the Consideration of Spending Thresholds in the Analysis of Fiscal Referendums

This paper concerns the political economy of budget balances and focuses on fiscal referendums. It specifically suggests – on the basis of theoretical arguments –that any analysis of fiscal referendums must take their spending thresholds into account. Thus, it claims that mandatory fiscal referendum...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Constitutional political economy 2004-12, Vol.15 (4), p.359-370
Main Author: Martin, Marc-Jean
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
analysis of collective decision-making
budget systems
Budgets
Decision making
Economic Models
Expenditure
Fiscal policy
Government Spending
Policy Making
Political Economy
Referendum
Referendums
state and local budget and expenditure
Studies
Theory
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:This paper concerns the political economy of budget balances and focuses on fiscal referendums. It specifically suggests – on the basis of theoretical arguments –that any analysis of fiscal referendums must take their spending thresholds into account. Thus, it claims that mandatory fiscal referendums can impose greater constraints than optional fiscal referendums. In conclusion, various recommendations based on this observation are proposed. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004
ISSN:1043-4062
1572-9966
DOI:10.1007/s10602-004-7768-5