A Neo-Downsian Model of the Alternative Vote as a Mechanism for Mitigating Ethnic Conflict in Plural Societies

Among those advocating the use of particular electoral mechanisms to reduce the prospects for conflict and strengthen democracy in societies that are deeply divided in ethnic or religious terms, there are two main approaches, one associated with Arend Lijphart, one with Donald Horowitz. Lijphart adv...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Public choice 2004-12, Vol.121 (3/4), p.487-506
Main Authors: Fraenkel, Jon, Grofman, Bernard
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
1210
9130
9179
Alliances
Alternative Approaches
Asia & the Pacific
Coalitions
Constituents
Decision making
Decision theory
Democracy
Electoral Systems
Ethnic conflict
Ethnic groups
Ethnic pluralism
Ethnic Relations
Ethnicity
Experimental/theoretical
Fiji
Fiji Islands
Interethnic conflict
Minority & ethnic groups
Minority & ethnic violence
Plural Societies
Political candidates
Political Elites
Politics
Politics & political behavior
Preferential voting
Public choice
Radical parties
Social Conflict
Studies
Voter behavior
Voting
Voting Behavior
Voting paradox
Voting patterns
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:Among those advocating the use of particular electoral mechanisms to reduce the prospects for conflict and strengthen democracy in societies that are deeply divided in ethnic or religious terms, there are two main approaches, one associated with Arend Lijphart, one with Donald Horowitz. Lijphart advocates using electoral rules such as list PR that strengthen the power of ethnically or religiously defined political elites in the context of implementing power-sharing mechanisms at the elite level that institutionalize norms such as proportional allocation and mutual veto across ethnies. Horowitz advocates using a preferential voting method, the alternative vote (AV), within constituencies that are multi-ethnic in character, to allow for voting across ethnic lines and to increase the likelihood of electing candidates whose perceived obligations are wider than their own ethnic group and/or to foster the creation of coalitions that are multi-ethnic in character. The main focus of this essay is the reformulation of Horowitz's approach in terms of ideas adapted from the neo-Downsian literature on median voter models. We illustrate Horowitz's approach with illustrations inspired by the predominantly biracial political competition in Fiji between native Fijians and those of Indian descent.
ISSN:0048-5829
1573-7101
DOI:10.1007/s11127-004-5794-5