Exchanging access goods for access: A comparative study of business lobbying in the European Union institutions

.  The aim of this article is to test empirically a theory of access that investigates the logic behind the apparent ad hoc lobbying behavior of business interests in the European Union (EU) multi‐level system. First, a theoretical framework is set out that attempts to explain the access of differen...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:European journal of political research 2004-05, Vol.43 (3), p.337-369
Main Author: BOUWEN, PIETER
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Access
Business
Comparative analysis
Economic Policy
Empirical research
European Union
European Union institutions
Finance
Interest Groups
Interviews
Lobbying
Policy Making
Political science
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Summary:.  The aim of this article is to test empirically a theory of access that investigates the logic behind the apparent ad hoc lobbying behavior of business interests in the European Union (EU) multi‐level system. First, a theoretical framework is set out that attempts to explain the access of different organizational forms of business interest representation – companies, associations and consultants – to the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The degree of access to these institutions is explained in terms of a theory of the supply and demand of access goods. Access goods concern information that is crucial in the EU policy‐making process. In return for access to an EU institution, business interests have to provide the access good(s) demanded by that institution. A number of specific hypotheses about access are analyzed in an extensive empirical study of the EU financial services sector. On the basis of 126 exploratory and semi‐structured interviews, the hypotheses are checked across the three EU institutions.
ISSN:0304-4130
1475-6765
DOI:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00157.x