Czar Rule in the Russian Congress of People's Deputies?

We construct a formal model, based upon the rules and structure of the Russian Congress of People's Deputies, to characterize equilibrium strategies pursued by an agenda-setting Speaker. In conjunction with information about the distribution of preferences in the RCPD, our Czar Rule model yield...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Legislative studies quarterly 1996-02, Vol.21 (1), p.5-40
Main Authors: Myagkov, Mikhail G., Kiewiet, D. Roderick
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Agenda
Ambivalence
Bloc voting
BORIS YELTSIN
CONFLICT
Congress
Congressional committees
Congressional voting
CONSTITUTIONS
CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA
Government
Legislatures
Modeling
PUBLIC POLICY
Russia
Tsars
Voter turnout
Voting
Voting patterns
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Summary:We construct a formal model, based upon the rules and structure of the Russian Congress of People's Deputies, to characterize equilibrium strategies pursued by an agenda-setting Speaker. In conjunction with information about the distribution of preferences in the RCPD, our Czar Rule model yields several testable hypotheses. The model receives some empirical backing, but overall the results of our analyses do not support it. We therefore attribute the conflict between the Yeltsin government and the RCPD to fundamental disagreements over policy and not to internal contradictions in constitutional design.
ISSN:0362-9805
DOI:10.2307/440156