Earnings Profiles of Department Heads: Comparing Cross-Section and Panel Models

Academics who become department heads suffer declining research skills because of time spent performing administrative tasks, and this skill depreciation slows future wage growth. This study examines Kansas State University faculty who served as department heads during the period 1965-92. Cross-sect...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Industrial & labor relations review 1996-01, Vol.49 (2), p.256-272
Main Authors: Ragan, James F., Rehman, Qazi Najeeb
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Academic profession
Bias
Careers
Case studies
Coefficients
Collective bargaining
College teachers
Colleges & universities
Committees
Comparative Study
Compensation
Compensation and benefits
Deans
Department Heads
Departments
Depreciation
Earnings
Economic models
Estimation bias
Faculty
Heads of department
Higher Education
Human capital
Individual Characteristics
Kansas
Labor contracts
Labor management relations
Modeling
Present value
Productivity
Profiles
Research Methodology
Research Skills
Salary administration
Salary Wage Differentials
Skills
State Schools
State Universities
Studies
Teachers
U.S.A
Universities
Universities and colleges
USA
Wage levels
Wages
Wages & salaries
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Summary:Academics who become department heads suffer declining research skills because of time spent performing administrative tasks, and this skill depreciation slows future wage growth. This study examines Kansas State University faculty who served as department heads during the period 1965-92. Cross-section estimates of the compensation for serving as department head are biased upward because of a correlation between unmeasured productivity characteristics and selection as department head. To correct for this bias, the authors reestimate earnings equations using a panel model that incorporates personal fixed effects. Although the average department head in the sample received a wage premium of 12%, the premium for past administrative service had completely disappeared for the typical former head. Another finding is that skill depreciation was most severe and wage growth most adversely affected in the sciences. As compensation, department heads in the sciences received a larger initial administrative premium than did other department heads.
ISSN:0019-7939
2162-271X
DOI:10.1177/001979399604900205