Freedom and Opportunity

The article discusses recent attempts in rational choice theory to take account of the opportunity aspect of freedom, i.e., the value of alternatives, in measuring freedom. It is argued that each of these approaches (in terms of fixed preferences, of possible future preferences and of the preference...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Political studies 1999-03, Vol.47 (1), p.67-82
Main Authors: Van Hees, Martin, Wissenburg, Marcel
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
CHOICE, IN ANY CONTEXT
Freedom
Freedoms
FUTURE (PAST AND PRESENT ATTEMPTS TO DEPICT IT)
Political theory
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY
Rational Decision
RATIONALITY
Theory
THEORY BUILDING OR THEORETICAL APPROACH
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Summary:The article discusses recent attempts in rational choice theory to take account of the opportunity aspect of freedom, i.e., the value of alternatives, in measuring freedom. It is argued that each of these approaches (in terms of fixed preferences, of possible future preferences and of the preferences of reasonable persons) fails to solve important conceptual problems. Furthermore, we argue that differences between measures of opportunity freedom reflect different moral standards for the quality of alternatives, not different conceptions of freedom as such. Hence, we propose to separate discussions about the meaning of the concept of freedom from the issue of determining the value of opportunity sets.
ISSN:0032-3217
1467-9248
DOI:10.1111/1467-9248.00188