Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?

Recent research on compliance in international regulatory regimes has argued (1) that compliance is generally quite good; (2) that this high level of compliance has been achieved with little attention to enforcement; (3) that those compliance problems that do exist are best addressed as management r...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International organization 1996-07, Vol.50 (3), p.379-406
Main Authors: Downs, George W., Rocke, David M., Barsoom, Peter N.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
AGREEMENTS, CONTRACTS, TREATIES, CONCORDATS, INTERSTATE COMPACTS
Arms control agreements
Arms limitation
Compliance
Cooperation
Economic regulation
Education
Enforcement
Environmental regulation
Extracurricular activities
International agreements
International aspects
International cooperation
International environmental cooperation
International law
International Organizations
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
International system
Law enforcement
Management
Noncompliance
Orchestras
Outer space treaties
Patient compliance
Political aspects
Political participation
REGIMES
Regulation
Sanctions
School music programs
Self-interest
Social aspects
STATES
Studies
Tariffs
TEXTS OF SIGNIFICANCE FOR REFERENCE, E.G., TREATIES, CONSTITUTIONS, FORMAL ACCORDS, JUDICIAL DECISIONS, ETC
Treaties
TREATIES, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Violations
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Summary:Recent research on compliance in international regulatory regimes has argued (1) that compliance is generally quite good; (2) that this high level of compliance has been achieved with little attention to enforcement; (3) that those compliance problems that do exist are best addressed as management rather than enforcement problems; and (4) that the management rather than the enforcement approach holds the key to the evolution of future regulatory cooperation in the international system. While the descriptive findings above are largely correct, the policy inferences are dangerously contaminated by endogeneity and selection problems. A high rate of compliance is often the result of states formulating treaties that require them to do little more than they would do in the absence of a treaty. In those cases where noncompliance does occur and where the effects of selection are attenuated, both self-interest and enforcement play significant roles.
ISSN:0020-8183
1531-5088
DOI:10.1017/S0020818300033427