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Preemptive Strike: Central Bank Reform in Chile's Transition from Authoritarian Rule

Under what conditions do exiting autoritarian elites use institutions to fend off the threat of democracy? One way to execute institutional insulation is to make the central bank autonomous from elected officials. Central bank autonomy both removes a key aspect of economic decision making from democ...

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Published in:	Comparative politics 1998-07, Vol.30 (4), p.443-462
Main Author:	Boylan, Delia M.
Format:	Article
Language:	English
Subjects:	Authoritarianism Banking Banking sector BANKING, BANKS Central banks Chile Democracy Economic policy Economic reform Elite Government and politics Insulation Macroeconomic stability Military government Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto Political change Political freedom Political reform POLITICAL STABILITY, INSTABILITY, & CHANGE Politicians Politics Reform REFORM, REFORMERS Reforms Regime transition Transition Transition economies
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container_issue	4
container_start_page	443
container_title	Comparative politics
container_volume	30
creator	Boylan, Delia M.
description	Under what conditions do exiting autoritarian elites use institutions to fend off the threat of democracy? One way to execute institutional insulation is to make the central bank autonomous from elected officials. Central bank autonomy both removes a key aspect of economic decision making from democratic control and constrains governments to pursue neoliberal policies. Where authoritarian elites know a regime change is imminent and fear a populist outcome, as in Chile in 1989, they can be expected to create an autonomous central bank to tie the hands of successor governments.
doi_str_mv	10.2307/422333
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ispartof	Comparative politics, 1998-07, Vol.30 (4), p.443-462
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source	International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection; PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts
subjects	Authoritarianism Banking Banking sector BANKING, BANKS Central banks Chile Democracy Economic policy Economic reform Elite Government and politics Insulation Macroeconomic stability Military government Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto Political change Political freedom Political reform POLITICAL STABILITY, INSTABILITY, & CHANGE Politicians Politics Reform REFORM, REFORMERS Reforms Regime transition Transition Transition economies
title	Preemptive Strike: Central Bank Reform in Chile's Transition from Authoritarian Rule
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