Crime, Deterrence, and Rational Choice

This study examines the deterrent effect of formal sanctions on criminal behavior. While most research on deterrence assumes a rational-choice model of criminal decision-making, few studies consider all of the major elements of the model. In particular, three critical limitations characterize the em...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:American sociological review 1986-02, Vol.51 (1), p.101-119
Main Authors: Piliavin, Irving, Gartner, Rosemary, Thornton, Craig, Matsueda, Ross L.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Behavior deterrence
Crime
Criminal arrests
Criminal behavior
Criminal justice
Criminal sanctions
Criminal sociology. Police. Delinquency. Deviance. Suicide
Criminals
Deterrence
Deviance
Drug related crimes
Fear of crime
Financial risk
Law enforcement
Rational choice
Rational decision
Rationality
Reinforcement
Sanctions
Social research
Sociology
Sociology of law and criminology
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Summary:This study examines the deterrent effect of formal sanctions on criminal behavior. While most research on deterrence assumes a rational-choice model of criminal decision-making, few studies consider all of the major elements of the model. In particular, three critical limitations characterize the empirical literature on deterrence: the failure to establish a causal ordering of sanctions and crime consistent with their temporal ordering; the focus on conventional populations and nonserious criminal acts, which are of less interest to the question of how society controls its members; and the inattention to the return or reward component of the decision-making process. To address these issues, we specify, estimate, and test a rational-choice model of crime on data that were collected on individuals, gathered within a longitudinal design, and derived from three distinct populations of persons at high risk of formal sanction. The results support the reward component of the rational-choice model, but fail to support the cost or deterrent component, as measured by perceived risks of formal sanctions.
ISSN:0003-1224
1939-8271
DOI:10.2307/2095480