Selection Dynamics, Asymptotic Stability, and Adaptive Behavior

Selection dynamics are often used to distinguish stable and unstable equilibria. This is particularly useful when multiple equilibria prevent a priori comparative static analysis. This paper reports an experiment designed to compare the accuracy of the myopic best-response dynamic and an inertial se...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Journal of political economy 1994-10, Vol.102 (5), p.975-1005
Main Authors: Van Huyck, John B., Cook, Joseph P., Battalio, Raymond C.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Behavior
Behaviorism
Chaos theory
Difference equations
Distribution functions
Dynamic models
Dynamical systems
Economic theory
Equilibrium models
Game theory
Graphical user interfaces
Inertia
Learning
Political Economy
Predictions
Statistical median
Theory
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Summary:Selection dynamics are often used to distinguish stable and unstable equilibria. This is particularly useful when multiple equilibria prevent a priori comparative static analysis. This paper reports an experiment designed to compare the accuracy of the myopic best-response dynamic and an inertial selection dynamic. The inertial selection dynamic makes more accurate predictions about the observed mutual best-response outcomes.
ISSN:0022-3808
1537-534X
DOI:10.1086/261961