The Structure of Organizational Incentives

To improve understanding and design of organizational incentives, we used confidential compensation data obtained for four distinct organizational levels (ranging from plant manager to corporate chief executive officer) to evaluate the ability of tournament, managerial power, and agency theories to...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Administrative science quarterly 1993-09, Vol.38 (3), p.438-461
Main Authors: Lambert, Richard A., Larcker, David F., Weigelt, Keith
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Business executives
Business management
Business structures
Careers
Cash
Chief executive officers
Compensation
Compensation management
Economic models
Executive compensation
Expected values
Hypotheses
Incentive plans
Incentives
Increasing functions
Managerial authority
Organization
Organization Theory
Organizational behavior
Organizational structure
Organizations
Social research
Statistical analysis
Structural aspects
Studies
Tournaments & championships
Wage surveys
Wages & salaries
Work incentives
Citations: Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:To improve understanding and design of organizational incentives, we used confidential compensation data obtained for four distinct organizational levels (ranging from plant manager to corporate chief executive officer) to evaluate the ability of tournament, managerial power, and agency theories to explain these observed compensation data. Our results suggest that organizational incentives are most appropriately characterized by a combination of these models, rather than being completely described by a single theoretical description.
ISSN:0001-8392
1930-3815
DOI:10.2307/2393375