The role of governmental agreements in breaking political deadlock

Resistance to socially desired reforms may arise from uncertainty concerning the identity of winners and losers from reforms. Without a binding commitment, a promise to compensate losers will not raise support for reforms due to a credibility problem. This paper shows that voting simultaneously on s...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:European Journal of Political Economy 1998-08, Vol.14 (3), p.561-572
Main Authors: Dur, Robert A.J, Swank, Otto H
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Agreement
Credibility
Decision theory
Government
Government formation
Mid-term cycle
Netherlands
Policy making
Policy reform
Politics
Reform
Voting Behavior
Voting behaviour
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Summary:Resistance to socially desired reforms may arise from uncertainty concerning the identity of winners and losers from reforms. Without a binding commitment, a promise to compensate losers will not raise support for reforms due to a credibility problem. This paper shows that voting simultaneously on several reforms may solve the credibility problem. It is argued that the governmental agreement in the Netherlands has served as a means to vote simultaneously on several reforms and has helped breaking political deadlocks. Moreover, we argue that the increased role of governmental agreements may have induced a mid-term cycle in electoral support for the government.
ISSN:0176-2680
1873-5703
DOI:10.1016/S0176-2680(98)00022-6