The role of governmental agreements in breaking political deadlock

Resistance to socially desired reforms may arise from uncertainty concerning the identity of winners and losers from reforms. Without a binding commitment, a promise to compensate losers will not raise support for reforms due to a credibility problem. This paper shows that voting simultaneously on s...

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Published in:European Journal of Political Economy 1998-08, Vol.14 (3), p.561-572
Main Authors: Dur, Robert A.J, Swank, Otto H
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Agreement
Credibility
Decision theory
Government
Government formation
Mid-term cycle
Netherlands
Policy making
Policy reform
Politics
Reform
Voting Behavior
Voting behaviour
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container_title European Journal of Political Economy
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creator Dur, Robert A.J
Swank, Otto H
description Resistance to socially desired reforms may arise from uncertainty concerning the identity of winners and losers from reforms. Without a binding commitment, a promise to compensate losers will not raise support for reforms due to a credibility problem. This paper shows that voting simultaneously on several reforms may solve the credibility problem. It is argued that the governmental agreement in the Netherlands has served as a means to vote simultaneously on several reforms and has helped breaking political deadlocks. Moreover, we argue that the increased role of governmental agreements may have induced a mid-term cycle in electoral support for the government.
doi_str_mv 10.1016/S0176-2680(98)00022-6
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source International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); ScienceDirect Freedom Collection; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts
subjects Agreement
Credibility
Decision theory
Government
Government formation
Mid-term cycle
Netherlands
Policy making
Policy reform
Politics
Reform
Voting Behavior
Voting behaviour
title The role of governmental agreements in breaking political deadlock
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