Consequentialism, rights, and the new social welfare theory

• Published in: The Journal of socio-economics 1999, Vol.28 (1), p.95-109
• Main Author: Roth, Timothy P.
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Analysis; Civil rights; Economic Theories; Economic theory; Economics; Effects; Morality; Pareto optimum; Rights; Social economics; Social problems; Social Theories; Social Welfare; Studies; Welfare economics
• ISSN: 1053-5357; 2214-8043; 1879-1239; 2214-8051
• DOI: 10.1016/S1053-5357(99)00013-X

Traditional consequentialist social welfare theory [SWT] is intendedly value-free and institutionless. It follows that, while unattenuated exchange and property rights are assigned an implicit, instrumental role in the achievement of first-best Paretian optima, little attention has focused on alternative rights construals, on their associated, correlative duties, and on the implications for SWT. This is true, even among economists who regard “freedom” as morally exigent. This paper argues that the rights which social welfare theorists regard as instrumentally important—and, therefore, legally sanctioned—need not, in consequentialist theory, be respected: The duties which are correlative to social welfare theorists' implicitly sanctioned rights may, in consequentialist terms, be overcome by purely utilitarian considerations. It follows, pari passu, that reliance on a goal-based efficiency standard is irreconcilable with respect for the rights which most economists either take to be intrinsically important or seek to justify. Granting this, normative analysis must take account of the logical and other tensions among consequences, rights, duties, and other dimensions of moral evaluation.