A cue of kinship promotes cooperation for the public good

Abstract Relatedness is a cornerstone of the evolution of social behavior. In the human lineage, the existence of cooperative kin networks was likely a critical stepping stone in the evolution of modern social complexity. Here we report the results of the first experimental manipulation of a putativ...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Evolution and human behavior 2008, Vol.29 (1), p.49-55
Main Authors: Krupp, Daniel Brian, Debruine, Lisa M, Barclay, Pat
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Cooperation
Cooperatives
Extended Family
Kinship
Kinship Networks
Lineage
Psychiatry
Public Goods
Social Behavior
Social behaviour
Social Networks
Social philosophy
Social theory
Tragedy of the commons
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Summary:Abstract Relatedness is a cornerstone of the evolution of social behavior. In the human lineage, the existence of cooperative kin networks was likely a critical stepping stone in the evolution of modern social complexity. Here we report the results of the first experimental manipulation of a putative cue of human kinship (facial self-resemblance) among ostensible players in a variant of the “tragedy of the commons,” the one-shot public goods game, in which group-level cooperation—via contributions made to the public good and the punishment of free riders—is supported at a personal cost. In accordance with theoretical predictions, contributions increased as a function of the “kin density” of the group. Moreover, the distribution of punishment was not contingent on kin density level. Our findings indicate that the presence of a subtle cue of genealogical relatedness facilitates group cooperation, supporting the hypothesis that the mechanisms fostering contemporary sociality took root in extended family networks.
ISSN:1090-5138
1879-0607
DOI:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.08.002