Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment

Punishing defectors is an important means of stabilizing cooperation. When levels of cooperation and punishment are continuous, individuals must employ suitable social standards for defining defectors and for determining punishment levels. Here we investigate the evolution of a social reaction norm,...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of theoretical biology 2009-03, Vol.257 (1), p.1-8
Main Authors: Nakamaru, Mayuko, Dieckmann, Ulf
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Animals
Bootstrapping
Cooperation
Cooperative Behavior
Evolution
Lattice-structured population
Models, Genetic
Models, Psychological
Psychological response
Punishment
Reaction norm
Selection, Genetic
Social Conformity
Social norm
Strict-and-severe punishment
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Summary:Punishing defectors is an important means of stabilizing cooperation. When levels of cooperation and punishment are continuous, individuals must employ suitable social standards for defining defectors and for determining punishment levels. Here we investigate the evolution of a social reaction norm, or psychological response function, for determining the punishment level meted out by individuals in dependence on the cooperation level exhibited by their neighbors in a lattice-structured population. We find that (1) cooperation and punishment can undergo runaway selection, with evolution towards enhanced cooperation and an ever more demanding punishment reaction norm mutually reinforcing each other; (2) this mechanism works best when punishment is strict, so that ambiguities in defining defectors are small; (3) when the strictness of punishment can adapt jointly with the threshold and severity of punishment, evolution favors the strict-and-severe punishment of individuals who offer slightly less than average cooperation levels; (4) strict-and-severe punishment naturally evolves and leads to much enhanced cooperation when cooperation without punishment would be weak and neither cooperation nor punishment are too costly; and (5) such evolutionary dynamics enable the bootstrapping of cooperation and punishment, through which defectors who never punish gradually and steadily evolve into cooperators who punish those they define as defectors.
ISSN:0022-5193
1095-8541
DOI:10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.09.004