Is Self Special? A Critical Review of Evidence From Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience

Varied research findings have been taken to support the claim that humans' representation of the self is "special," that is, that it emerges from systems that are physically and functionally distinct from those used for more general purpose cognitive processing. The authors evaluate t...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Psychological bulletin 2005-01, Vol.131 (1), p.76-97
Main Authors: Gillihan, Seth J, Farah, Martha J
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Anatomical correlates of behavior
Behavioral psychophysiology
Biological and medical sciences
Brain - anatomy & histology
Cognition
Cognition & reasoning
Cognitive Neuroscience
Cognitive neurosciences
Cognitive Processes
Cognitive processing
Cognitive Science - methods
Experimental Psychology
Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology
Human
Humans
Literature reviews
Magnetic Resonance Imaging
Neurology
Neuropsychology
Neurosciences
Neurosciences - methods
Personality. Affectivity
Psychology
Psychology, Experimental - methods
Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry
Psychology. Psychophysiology
Recognition (Psychology)
Self
Self Concept
Self representation
Selfrepresentation
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Summary:Varied research findings have been taken to support the claim that humans' representation of the self is "special," that is, that it emerges from systems that are physically and functionally distinct from those used for more general purpose cognitive processing. The authors evaluate this claim by reviewing the relevant literatures and addressing the criteria for considering a system special, the various operationalizations of self, and how the studies' findings relate to the conclusions drawn. The authors conclude that many of the claims for the special status of self-related processing are premature given the evidence and that the various self-related research programs do not seem to be illuminating a unitary, common system, despite individuals' subjective experience of a unified self.
ISSN:0033-2909
1939-1455
DOI:10.1037/0033-2909.131.1.76