The unified theory of repression

• Published in: The Behavioral and brain sciences 2006-10, Vol.29 (5), p.499-511
• Main Author: Erdelyi, Matthew Hugh
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: avoidance; Bartlett; Biological and medical sciences; Cognitive ability; Consciousness; defense; denial; distortion; Early experience; Ebbinghaus; false-memories; Freud; Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology; Human; Humans; inhibition; Inhibition (Psychology); Laboratories; Learning. Memory; Memory; Psychological Theory; Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry; Psychology. Psychophysiology; repression; Repression, Psychology; suppression; Terminology
• ISSN: 0140-525X; 1469-1825
• DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X06009113

Repression has become an empirical fact that is at once obvious and problematic. Fragmented clinical and laboratory traditions and disputed terminology have resulted in a Babel of misunderstandings in which false distinctions are imposed (e.g., between repression and suppression) and necessary distinctions not drawn (e.g., between the mechanism and the use to which it is put, defense being just one). “Repression” was introduced by Herbart to designate the (nondefensive) inhibition of ideas by other ideas in their struggle for consciousness. Freud adapted repression to the defensive inhibition of “unbearable” mental contents. Substantial experimental literatures on attentional biases, thought avoidance, interference, and intentional forgetting exist, the oldest prototype being the work of Ebbinghaus, who showed that intentional avoidance of memories results in their progressive forgetting over time. It has now become clear, as clinicians had claimed, that the inaccessible materials are often available and emerge indirectly (e.g., procedurally, implicitly). It is also now established that the Ebbinghaus retention function can be partly reversed, with resulting increases of conscious memory over time (hypermnesia). Freud's clinical experience revealed early on that exclusion from consciousness was effected not just by simple repression (inhibition) but also by a variety of distorting techniques, some deployed to degrade latent contents (denial), all eventually subsumed under the rubric of defense mechanisms (“repression in the widest sense”). Freudian and Bartlettian distortions are essentially the same, even in name, except for motive (cognitive vs. emotional), and experimentally induced false memories and other “memory illusions” are laboratory analogs of self-induced distortions.