Animist thinking in the elderly and in patients with Alzheimer's disease

Some patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD) reveal low-level impairment in their concepts of living things (i.e., forgetting that zebras are striped). To test for more profound impairment, we investigated the concept alive-a "higher order" concept spanning every member of the domain....

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Cognitive neuropsychology 2008-02, Vol.25 (1), p.27-37
Main Authors: Zaitchik, Deborah, Solomon, Gregg E. A.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Adult
Adult and adolescent clinical studies
Aged
Aged, 80 and over
Aging
Alzheimer Disease - diagnosis
Alzheimer Disease - psychology
Alzheimer's disease
Animals
Biological and medical sciences
Concept Formation
Conceptual change
Culture
Degenerative and inherited degenerative diseases of the nervous system. Leukodystrophies. Prion diseases
Discrimination (Psychology)
Domain-specificity
Female
Folkbiology
Humans
Judgment
Male
Medical sciences
Motor Activity
Neurology
Neuropsychological Tests
Organic mental disorders. Neuropsychology
Plants
Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry
Psychopathology. Psychiatry
Thinking
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Summary:Some patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD) reveal low-level impairment in their concepts of living things (i.e., forgetting that zebras are striped). To test for more profound impairment, we investigated the concept alive-a "higher order" concept spanning every member of the domain. Many elderly controls were animists, attributing life to inanimates capable of self-generated activity (the sun, fire). Most AD patients were animists, with half even attributing life to inanimates whose activity is not self-generated (cars, lamps). Adult animists, like young children who have not yet acquired biological concepts, overattributed life to active inanimates. We believe this reflects an innate disposition to view active entities as agents, and that agency interferes with the biological concept alive. This interference, we suggest, reflects degradation of biological concepts in the face of spared perception of agents. It sheds light on the nature of fundamental questions concerning conceptual organization, innate endowment, and conceptual change.
ISSN:0264-3294
1464-0627
DOI:10.1080/02643290801904059