The Intelligence of the Moral Intuitions: Comment on Haidt (2001)

The social intuitionist model ( J. Haidt, 2001 ) posits that fast and automatic intuitions are the primary source of moral judgments. Conscious deliberations play little causal role; they are used mostly to construct post hoc justifications for judgments that have already occurred. In this article,...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Psychological review 2003-01, Vol.110 (1), p.193-196
Main Authors: Pizarro, David A, Bloom, Paul
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Cognition
Cognition & reasoning
Decision Making
Humans
Intelligence
Intuition
Judgement
Judgment
Knowledge
Morality
Morals
Psychological aspects
Psychology
Reasoning
Social psychology
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Summary:The social intuitionist model ( J. Haidt, 2001 ) posits that fast and automatic intuitions are the primary source of moral judgments. Conscious deliberations play little causal role; they are used mostly to construct post hoc justifications for judgments that have already occurred. In this article, the authors present evidence that fast and automatic moral intuitions are actually shaped and informed by prior reasoning. More generally, there is considerable evidence from outside the laboratory that people actively engage in reasoning when faced with real-world moral dilemmas. Together, these facts limit the strong claims of the social intuitionist model concerning the irrelevance of conscious deliberation.
ISSN:0033-295X
1939-1471
DOI:10.1037/0033-295X.110.1.193