Estimating hourly anaesthetic and surgical reimbursement from private medical insurers’ benefit maxima: implications for pricing services and for incentives

• Published in: Anaesthesia 2010-04, Vol.65 (4), p.396-408
• Main Authors: Stubbs, D., Ward, M. E., Pandit, J. J.
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Algorithms; Anesthesia; Anesthesia. Intensive care medicine. Transfusions. Cell therapy and gene therapy; Anesthesiology; Anesthesiology - economics; Biological and medical sciences; Costs and Cost Analysis - statistics & numerical data; Health insurance; Humans; Income - statistics & numerical data; Insurance, Health, Reimbursement - economics; Medical sciences; Physicians; Private medical care; Private Sector - economics; Reimbursement; Specialties, Surgical - economics; State Medicine - economics; Surgeons; United Kingdom; Wage rates
• ISSN: 0003-2409; 1365-2044
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1365-2044.2009.06238.x

Summary While some speculation surrounds annual private practice incomes of anaesthetists, little is known of the hours of work needed to generate any presumed income (the hourly rate). The benefit maxima of five private medical insurers are published in fee schedules and data on the duration of common operations are now also known. In this study we combined these to generate estimates for hourly rates of reimbursement across 78 common operations in eight surgical subspecialties, for anaesthetists and surgeons. We expected to find significant differences between insurers as a result of market competition, and we expected differences between anaesthetists and surgeons. The median (IQR [range]) rate of reimbursement for anaesthetists was £167 (132–211 [68–570]).h−1 with significant variation across subspecialties (p  0.17). Patterns of reimbursement for surgeons were similar to those for anaesthetists, except that surgeons were reimbursed at about twice the rate. We conclude there is a confluence of insurer reimbursement levels and we discuss potential implications of this finding. Our results also have implications for how incentives between the NHS and private practice, or within a private practice group, might be optimally managed.