Political Competition as an Obstacle to Judicial Independence: Evidence From Russia and Ukraine

A large literature attributes independent courts to intense political competition. Existing theories, however, have a previously unrecognized boundary condition— they apply only to consolidated democracies. This article proposes a strategic pressure theory of judicial (in)dependence in electoral dem...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Comparative political studies 2010-10, Vol.43 (10), p.1202-1229
Main Author: Popova, Maria
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Campaigns
Candidates
Comparative analysis
Competition
Courts
Democracy
Democratization
Disputes
Elections
Electoral behaviour
Independence
Judiciary
Judiciary power
Personnel selection
Political campaigns
Political identity
Quantitative analysis
Registration
Russia
Russian Federation
Ukraine
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Summary:A large literature attributes independent courts to intense political competition. Existing theories, however, have a previously unrecognized boundary condition— they apply only to consolidated democracies. This article proposes a strategic pressure theory of judicial (in)dependence in electoral democracies, which posits that intense political competition magnifies the benefits of subservient courts to incumbents, thus reducing rather than increasing judicial independence. The theory’s predictions are tested through quantitative analysis of electoral registration disputes adjudicated by Russian and Ukrainian courts during the 2002-2003 parliamentary campaigns. Selection models show that in Ukraine, progovernment candidates have a higher than average probability of winning in court, whereas in Russia the political affiliation of the plaintiff does not predict success at trial. Thus, the data show that judicial independence is lower in the more competitive electoral democracy (Ukraine) than in the less competitive electoral democracy (Russia).
ISSN:0010-4140
1552-3829
DOI:10.1177/0010414010369075