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Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games

This paper compares the leader and follower payoff in a duopoly game, as they arise in sequential play, with the Nash payoff in simultaneous play. If the game is symmetric, has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, and players' payoffs are monotonic in the opponent's choice along their own...

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Published in:	Games and economic behavior 2010-07, Vol.69 (2), p.512-516
Main Author:	von Stengel, Bernhard
Format:	Article
Language:	English
Subjects:	Comparative analysis Cournot Cournot Duopoly game Endogenous timing Follower Leader Stackelberg Strategic complements Strategic substitutes Duopoly Duopoly game Endogenous timing Follower Game theory Leader Leaders Leadership Nash equilibrium Pay-off Payoffs Stackelberg Strategic complements Strategic substitutes Studies
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container_title	Games and economic behavior
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creator	von Stengel, Bernhard
description	This paper compares the leader and follower payoff in a duopoly game, as they arise in sequential play, with the Nash payoff in simultaneous play. If the game is symmetric, has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, and players' payoffs are monotonic in the opponent's choice along their own best reply function, then the follower payoff is either higher than the leader payoff, or even lower than in the simultaneous game. This gap for the possible follower payoff had not been observed in earlier duopoly models of endogenous timing.
doi_str_mv	10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.012
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source	International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); ScienceDirect Journals
subjects	Comparative analysis Cournot Cournot Duopoly game Endogenous timing Follower Leader Stackelberg Strategic complements Strategic substitutes Duopoly Duopoly game Endogenous timing Follower Game theory Leader Leaders Leadership Nash equilibrium Pay-off Payoffs Stackelberg Strategic complements Strategic substitutes Studies
title	Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games
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