Decision making in quasi-markets: A pedagogic analysis

The objective of the 1991 NHS reforms was to reduce “excessive” vertical integration by constructing a quasi-market in which incentive structures and increased availability of information would enable decision makers make better use of resources. There is, however, no overall framework in which to c...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of health economics 1996-04, Vol.15 (2), p.187-208
Main Authors: Jones, Philip R., Cullis, John G.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Budgets
Cost Savings
Cream skimming
Decision making
Decision Making, Organizational
Economic Competition - statistics & numerical data
Family Practice - economics
Government agencies
Health administration
Health care
Health care policy
Health Care Rationing - economics
Health Care Rationing - organization & administration
Health Care Rationing - standards
Health Care Reform - economics
Health Care Reform - organization & administration
Health Care Reform - standards
Health Services Research
Insurance Selection Bias
Market structure
Models, Economic
National health insurance
National Health Service
NHS reforms
Privatization - economics
Public sector
Quasi-markets
Reform
Reforms
Reimbursement, Incentive
Social Welfare - economics
State Medicine - economics
State Medicine - organization & administration
State Medicine - standards
Statistical analysis
Studies
Surveys and Questionnaires
Treatment Refusal
United Kingdom
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Summary:The objective of the 1991 NHS reforms was to reduce “excessive” vertical integration by constructing a quasi-market in which incentive structures and increased availability of information would enable decision makers make better use of resources. There is, however, no overall framework in which to consider the welfare gains which result from the introduction of a quasi-market or the welfare losses which arise from distortions in a quasi-market. This paper offers an analysis which can be applied to illustrate the difficulty of estimating the welfare loss from cream skimming and also to consider the impact of local monopoly.
ISSN:0167-6296
1879-1646
DOI:10.1016/0167-6296(95)00037-2