Transparency and Accountability: Empirical Results for Us States

Recent formal models of accountability allow us to make different conditional predictions about how transparency affects voters’ willingness to re-elect incumbents and acceptance of higher taxes. We review two models and investigate empirical implications derived from or related to them, using panel...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of theoretical politics 2010-10, Vol.22 (4), p.379-406
Main Authors: Alt, James E., Lowry, Robert C.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Accountability
Budgets
Elections
Empirical research
Fiscal policy
Governors
Local finance
Panel Data
Political economy
Politics
Prediction
Public budgeting
State budgets
State government
Structural Models
Taxation
Taxes
Transparency
U.S.A
Voters
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:Recent formal models of accountability allow us to make different conditional predictions about how transparency affects voters’ willingness to re-elect incumbents and acceptance of higher taxes. We review two models and investigate empirical implications derived from or related to them, using panel data from 1972—2000 for U.S. state budget process transparency, gubernatorial elections, and tax increases in a small structural model. We do not find that budget transparency has a direct effect on incumbent retention, but we do find clear evidence that increased transparency dampens the negative effect of tax increases on retention of incumbent governors. Independent of this, we also find that increased transparency leads to greater fiscal scale. We suggest some possible directions for future models based on our results.
ISSN:0951-6298
1460-3667
DOI:10.1177/0951629810375641