Blame-game politics in a coalition government

Delays in the adoption of reforms is an important question in political economics. This paper explores this issue in the context of a representative democracy where the government is a coalition and citizens observe neither the decision-making process, nor politicians' preferences for a reform....

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of public economics 2007-02, Vol.91 (1), p.77-96
Main Author: Dellis, Arnaud
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Bargaining
Coalition government
Coalitions
Decision making
Delayed adoption of reforms
Government
Political economy
Politicians
Reputation
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Summary:Delays in the adoption of reforms is an important question in political economics. This paper explores this issue in the context of a representative democracy where the government is a coalition and citizens observe neither the decision-making process, nor politicians' preferences for a reform. We show that a coalition member who favors a reform may nonetheless choose to veto its adoption (thus delaying it until after the next election) and let his coalition partners share the blame for the non-adoption. We refer to this strategy as blame-game politics. We then identify three reasons for a politician to play the blame-game. One is to make an issue salient in the next election. A second reason is to avoid a split in his electorate, which is accomplished by hiding his stance on an issue. A third reason is to enhance ‘bargaining power’ during the formation of the next government.
ISSN:0047-2727
1879-2316
DOI:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.08.006