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The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game When R > 2: Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates
In Tullock's rent-seeking model, the probability a player wins the game depends on expenditures raised to the power R. We show that a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium exists when R > 2, and that overdissipation of rents does not arise in any Nash equilibrium. We derive a tight lower...
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| Published in: | Public choice 1994-12, Vol.81 (3/4), p.363-380 |
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| Main Authors: | , , |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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| cited_by | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c3258-c7654ddd6a70b6f03bdf58317c9977df68a4fdea78cca3070b7e035a78b688eb3 |
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| cites | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c3258-c7654ddd6a70b6f03bdf58317c9977df68a4fdea78cca3070b7e035a78b688eb3 |
| container_end_page | 380 |
| container_issue | 3/4 |
| container_start_page | 363 |
| container_title | Public choice |
| container_volume | 81 |
| creator | Baye, Michael R. Kovenock, Dan de Vries, Casper G. |
| description | In Tullock's rent-seeking model, the probability a player wins the game depends on expenditures raised to the power R. We show that a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium exists when R > 2, and that overdissipation of rents does not arise in any Nash equilibrium. We derive a tight lower bound on the level of rent dissipation that arises in a symmetric equilibrium when the strategy space is discrete, and show that full rent dissipation occurs when the strategy space is continuous. Our results are shown to be consistent with recent experimental evidence on the dissipation of rents. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/BF01053238 |
| format | article |
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| identifier | ISSN: 0048-5829 |
| ispartof | Public choice, 1994-12, Vol.81 (3/4), p.363-380 |
| issn | 0048-5829 1573-7101 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_839018910 |
| source | EBSCOhost Business Source Ultimate; International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Springer Online Journals Archive Complete; JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection; Social Science Premium Collection; ABI/INFORM Global; Politics Collection; Sociology Collection; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; EBSCO_EconLit with Full Text（美国经济学会全文数据库） |
| subjects | Auctions Bids Campaign literature Competition Economic models Economic Policy Economic rent Equilibrium Expenditures Experimental results Game Theory Hypotheses Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium Null hypothesis Political economy Politics Rent seeking behavior Rent-seeking Strategy |
| title | The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game When R > 2: Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates |
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