Tender offers to influential shareholders

In this paper I analyze a tender offer to shareholders who can influence the outcome of the offer, and I show that several results from atomistic shareholder models no longer hold when shareholders are influential. I find closed-form solutions for the probability that a shareholder tenders in the pr...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of banking & finance 1997-04, Vol.21 (4), p.529-540
Main Author: Liebler, Robert J.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Economic models
Finance
Game theory
Owners
Shareholder relations
Stock prices
Stockholders
Tender offers
Citations: Items that this one cites
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Summary:In this paper I analyze a tender offer to shareholders who can influence the outcome of the offer, and I show that several results from atomistic shareholder models no longer hold when shareholders are influential. I find closed-form solutions for the probability that a shareholder tenders in the presence of a foothold position or dilution, and I examine the relation between a conditional and an unconditional offer.
ISSN:0378-4266
1872-6372
DOI:10.1016/S0378-4266(96)00051-9