Bargaining, efficiency wages, and the price–cost markup

The size of the negative effect of unions on the price–cost markup in efficient bargain models depends on the extent to which the union cares about employment rather than wages. A negative effect in labour demand models can also arise under efficiency wages.

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economics letters 1998-02, Vol.58 (2), p.193-197
Main Author: Sanfey, Peter J
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Bargaining
Bargaining Power
Costs
Efficiency Wages
Markup
Prices
Wage negotiations
Wages
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Description
Summary:The size of the negative effect of unions on the price–cost markup in efficient bargain models depends on the extent to which the union cares about employment rather than wages. A negative effect in labour demand models can also arise under efficiency wages.
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00271-1