Weathering Corruption

Could bad weather be responsible for U.S. corruption? Natural disasters create resource windfalls in the states they strike by triggering federally provided natural‐disaster relief. By increasing the benefit of fraudulent appropriation and creating new opportunities for such theft, disaster‐relief w...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Journal of law & economics 2008-11, Vol.51 (4), p.667-681
Main Authors: Leeson, Peter T., Sobel, Russell S.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Administrative agencies
Correlation analysis
Corruption
Data corruption
Disaster relief
Disasters
Economic incentives
Emergency management
Floods
Government corruption
Government officials
Hurricanes
Hypotheses
Natural disasters
Political corruption
Political economy
Public officials
Public sector
States
Studies
U.S.A
Weather
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Summary:Could bad weather be responsible for U.S. corruption? Natural disasters create resource windfalls in the states they strike by triggering federally provided natural‐disaster relief. By increasing the benefit of fraudulent appropriation and creating new opportunities for such theft, disaster‐relief windfalls may also increase corruption. We investigate this hypothesis by exploring the effect of disaster relief provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on public corruption. The results support our hypothesis. Each additional $100 per capita in FEMA relief increases the average state’s corruption by nearly 102 percent. Our findings suggest notoriously corrupt regions of the United States, such as the Gulf Coast, are in part notoriously corrupt because natural disasters frequently strike them. They attract more disaster relief, which makes them more corrupt.
ISSN:0022-2186
1537-5285
DOI:10.1086/590129