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A Property-Rights Analysis of the Yugoslav Miracle
The Yugoslav experiment with labor participation in the management of business firms captured worldwide attention. The critics of capitalism seemed confident that the labor-managed economy would provide a long-sought alternative to the accomplishments of capitalism. Instead, the labor-managed econom...
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Published in: | The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 1990-01, Vol.507 (1), p.123-132 |
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creator | Pejovich, Svetozar |
description | The Yugoslav experiment with labor participation in the management of business firms captured worldwide attention. The critics of capitalism seemed confident that the labor-managed economy would provide a long-sought alternative to the accomplishments of capitalism. Instead, the labor-managed economy has produced a crisis of enormous proportion in Yugoslavia. The article argues that the economic crisis in Yugoslavia is a predictable consequence of the system of labor participation in the management of business firms. It demonstrates that inherent in the structure of property rights of the labormanaged economy are some positive transaction costs and negative incentives that are specific to its institutional structure. Those transaction costs and disincentives are responsible for inflation, unemployment, declining income, and other economic problems in Yugoslavia. The conclusion is that the labormanaged economy is not a viable institutional arrangement. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1177/0002716290507001013 |
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subjects | Business economics Business structures Civil Rights E.G., CROATIA Economic conditions Economic costs ECONOMIC POLICY Economic reform Economic systems Economics Experimental economics Governmental reform Institutional economics Labor economics LABOR UNIONS (BUT NOT GUILDS) Political science PROPERTY Property rights SOCIALISM Transaction costs YUGOSLAVIA |
title | A Property-Rights Analysis of the Yugoslav Miracle |
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