Trading volume, management solicitation, and shareholder voting

In an investigation of possible relationships between shareholder voting turnout, trading volume after the record data, and the intervals between the record and meeting dates, we find that higher trading volume and more trading days between the record date and the receipt of proxy materials both red...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of financial economics 1993-02, Vol.33 (1), p.57-71
Main Authors: Young, Philip J., Millar, James A., Glezen, G.William
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Hypotheses
Management
Proxy solicitation
Regression analysis
Securities trading
Shareholder meetings
Shareholder relations
Shareholder voting
Stockholders
Studies
Voting
Voting turnout
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Summary:In an investigation of possible relationships between shareholder voting turnout, trading volume after the record data, and the intervals between the record and meeting dates, we find that higher trading volume and more trading days between the record date and the receipt of proxy materials both reduce voting turnout. A longer interval between the receipt of proxy materials and the meeting increases turnout, as does greater solicitation expense. Our tests show that management mails proxies further in advance of the meeting when its proposals require a majority of shares outstanding, as opposed to votes cast, for approval.
ISSN:0304-405X
1879-2774
DOI:10.1016/0304-405X(93)90024-6