Effects of increased incentives upon the use of threat in bargaining

32 dyads participated in a bargaining game, similar to the trucking game developed by Deutsch and Krauss. All Ss were given the opportunity to threaten one another within the context of the game. ½ of the Ss played for real money in fairly large amounts, ½ for imaginary money. The results indicated...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of personality and social psychology 1966-07, Vol.4 (1), p.14-20
Main Author: Gallo, Philip S
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Bargaining
Dyads
Female
Games
Human
Humans
Incentives
Interpersonal Relations
Motivation
Reward
Stress, Physiological
Threat
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Summary:32 dyads participated in a bargaining game, similar to the trucking game developed by Deutsch and Krauss. All Ss were given the opportunity to threaten one another within the context of the game. ½ of the Ss played for real money in fairly large amounts, ½ for imaginary money. The results indicated that the intense conflict present when imaginary money is used was ameliorated considerably when real money was at stake.
ISSN:0022-3514
1939-1315
DOI:10.1037/h0023510