The Loss of Uniqueness

Philosophers and linguists alike tend to call a semantic theory ‘Russellian’ just in case it assigns to sentences in which definite descriptions occur the truth-conditions Russell did in ‘On Denoting’. This is unfortunate; not all aspects of those particular truth-conditions do explanatory work in R...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Mind 2005-10, Vol.114 (456), p.1185-1222
Main Author: Szabo, Zoltan Gendler
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Criticism
Definite articles
Definite descriptions
Epithets
Intuition
Linguistics
Logic
Logical form
Ordinary language philosophy
Philosophers
Philosophy
Phrases
Predicates
Russell, Bertrand Arthur William (1872-1970)
Semantics
Uniqueness
Citations: Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
cited_by cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c385t-4a6e794b8aee7addca1b1f3cfa8009ba798338ceda5facbbddcfc5ba5c7f56f53
cites
container_end_page 1222
container_issue 456
container_start_page 1185
container_title Mind
container_volume 114
creator Szabo, Zoltan Gendler
description Philosophers and linguists alike tend to call a semantic theory ‘Russellian’ just in case it assigns to sentences in which definite descriptions occur the truth-conditions Russell did in ‘On Denoting’. This is unfortunate; not all aspects of those particular truth-conditions do explanatory work in Russell's writings. As far as the semantics of descriptions is concerned, the key insights of ‘On Denoting’ are that definite descriptions are not uniformly referring expressions, and that they are scope-bearing elements. Anyone who accepts these two claims can account for Russell's puzzle cases the way he did. Russell had no substantive argument for the claim that ‘The F is G’ entails ‘There is at most one F’; in fact, he had important misgivings about it. I outline an argument against this claim, and I argue that by holding on to uniqueness contemporary semanticists make a momentous mistake: they keep the illusion alive that there is a way to account for linguistic meaning without addressing what linguistic expressions are for.
doi_str_mv 10.1093/mind/fzi1185
format article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_85644890</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>3840626</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>3840626</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c385t-4a6e794b8aee7addca1b1f3cfa8009ba798338ceda5facbbddcfc5ba5c7f56f53</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp90L1LAzEYBvAgCtbqJk4OxUEcPJvvj1HrR4UDlxZKl5DLJXi1vavJFdS_3pQrHRzM8g7vjye8DwDnCN4hqMhwVdXl0P9UCEl2AHqIcphhhMgh6EGIeUYpJsfgJMYFTI8L1AMXk3c3yJsYB40fTOvqc-NqF-MpOPJmGd3ZbvbB9PlpMhpn-dvL6-g-zyyRrM2o4U4oWkjjnDBlaQ0qkCfWGwmhKoxQkhBpXWmYN7YokvCWFYZZ4Rn3jPTBdZe7Dk36OrZ6VUXrlktTu2YTtWScUqlggjf_QgQJExhSss28-kMXzSbU6QyNseQQYakSuu2QDen44Lxeh2plwndK0tsy9bZMvSsz8cuOL2LbhL0lkkKOeVpn3bqKrfvar0340FwQwfR4NtezR0Vw_qD0nPwCspaAbQ</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>228601289</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>The Loss of Uniqueness</title><source>EBSCOhost MLA International Bibliography With Full Text</source><source>Oxford Journals Online</source><source>Linguistics and Language Behavior Abstracts (LLBA)</source><source>JSTOR Archival Journals</source><source>Humanities Index</source><creator>Szabo, Zoltan Gendler</creator><creatorcontrib>Szabo, Zoltan Gendler</creatorcontrib><description>Philosophers and linguists alike tend to call a semantic theory ‘Russellian’ just in case it assigns to sentences in which definite descriptions occur the truth-conditions Russell did in ‘On Denoting’. This is unfortunate; not all aspects of those particular truth-conditions do explanatory work in Russell's writings. As far as the semantics of descriptions is concerned, the key insights of ‘On Denoting’ are that definite descriptions are not uniformly referring expressions, and that they are scope-bearing elements. Anyone who accepts these two claims can account for Russell's puzzle cases the way he did. Russell had no substantive argument for the claim that ‘The F is G’ entails ‘There is at most one F’; in fact, he had important misgivings about it. I outline an argument against this claim, and I argue that by holding on to uniqueness contemporary semanticists make a momentous mistake: they keep the illusion alive that there is a way to account for linguistic meaning without addressing what linguistic expressions are for.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0026-4423</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1460-2113</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzi1185</identifier><identifier>CODEN: MNDDAB</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Oxford: Oxford University Press</publisher><subject>Criticism ; Definite articles ; Definite descriptions ; Epithets ; Intuition ; Linguistics ; Logic ; Logical form ; Ordinary language philosophy ; Philosophers ; Philosophy ; Phrases ; Predicates ; Russell, Bertrand Arthur William (1872-1970) ; Semantics ; Uniqueness</subject><ispartof>Mind, 2005-10, Vol.114 (456), p.1185-1222</ispartof><rights>Copyright 2005 Mind Association</rights><rights>Copyright Oxford University Press(England) Oct 2005</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c385t-4a6e794b8aee7addca1b1f3cfa8009ba798338ceda5facbbddcfc5ba5c7f56f53</citedby></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3840626$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/3840626$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,27923,27924,31269,33848,33849,58237,58470</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Szabo, Zoltan Gendler</creatorcontrib><title>The Loss of Uniqueness</title><title>Mind</title><addtitle>Mind</addtitle><description>Philosophers and linguists alike tend to call a semantic theory ‘Russellian’ just in case it assigns to sentences in which definite descriptions occur the truth-conditions Russell did in ‘On Denoting’. This is unfortunate; not all aspects of those particular truth-conditions do explanatory work in Russell's writings. As far as the semantics of descriptions is concerned, the key insights of ‘On Denoting’ are that definite descriptions are not uniformly referring expressions, and that they are scope-bearing elements. Anyone who accepts these two claims can account for Russell's puzzle cases the way he did. Russell had no substantive argument for the claim that ‘The F is G’ entails ‘There is at most one F’; in fact, he had important misgivings about it. I outline an argument against this claim, and I argue that by holding on to uniqueness contemporary semanticists make a momentous mistake: they keep the illusion alive that there is a way to account for linguistic meaning without addressing what linguistic expressions are for.</description><subject>Criticism</subject><subject>Definite articles</subject><subject>Definite descriptions</subject><subject>Epithets</subject><subject>Intuition</subject><subject>Linguistics</subject><subject>Logic</subject><subject>Logical form</subject><subject>Ordinary language philosophy</subject><subject>Philosophers</subject><subject>Philosophy</subject><subject>Phrases</subject><subject>Predicates</subject><subject>Russell, Bertrand Arthur William (1872-1970)</subject><subject>Semantics</subject><subject>Uniqueness</subject><issn>0026-4423</issn><issn>1460-2113</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2005</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>C18</sourceid><sourceid>7T9</sourceid><recordid>eNp90L1LAzEYBvAgCtbqJk4OxUEcPJvvj1HrR4UDlxZKl5DLJXi1vavJFdS_3pQrHRzM8g7vjye8DwDnCN4hqMhwVdXl0P9UCEl2AHqIcphhhMgh6EGIeUYpJsfgJMYFTI8L1AMXk3c3yJsYB40fTOvqc-NqF-MpOPJmGd3ZbvbB9PlpMhpn-dvL6-g-zyyRrM2o4U4oWkjjnDBlaQ0qkCfWGwmhKoxQkhBpXWmYN7YokvCWFYZZ4Rn3jPTBdZe7Dk36OrZ6VUXrlktTu2YTtWScUqlggjf_QgQJExhSss28-kMXzSbU6QyNseQQYakSuu2QDen44Lxeh2plwndK0tsy9bZMvSsz8cuOL2LbhL0lkkKOeVpn3bqKrfvar0340FwQwfR4NtezR0Vw_qD0nPwCspaAbQ</recordid><startdate>20051001</startdate><enddate>20051001</enddate><creator>Szabo, Zoltan Gendler</creator><general>Oxford University Press</general><general>Oxford Publishing Limited (England)</general><scope>BSCLL</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>C18</scope><scope>7T9</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20051001</creationdate><title>The Loss of Uniqueness</title><author>Szabo, Zoltan Gendler</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c385t-4a6e794b8aee7addca1b1f3cfa8009ba798338ceda5facbbddcfc5ba5c7f56f53</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2005</creationdate><topic>Criticism</topic><topic>Definite articles</topic><topic>Definite descriptions</topic><topic>Epithets</topic><topic>Intuition</topic><topic>Linguistics</topic><topic>Logic</topic><topic>Logical form</topic><topic>Ordinary language philosophy</topic><topic>Philosophers</topic><topic>Philosophy</topic><topic>Phrases</topic><topic>Predicates</topic><topic>Russell, Bertrand Arthur William (1872-1970)</topic><topic>Semantics</topic><topic>Uniqueness</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Szabo, Zoltan Gendler</creatorcontrib><collection>Istex</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Humanities Index</collection><collection>Linguistics and Language Behavior Abstracts (LLBA)</collection><jtitle>Mind</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Szabo, Zoltan Gendler</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>The Loss of Uniqueness</atitle><jtitle>Mind</jtitle><addtitle>Mind</addtitle><date>2005-10-01</date><risdate>2005</risdate><volume>114</volume><issue>456</issue><spage>1185</spage><epage>1222</epage><pages>1185-1222</pages><issn>0026-4423</issn><eissn>1460-2113</eissn><coden>MNDDAB</coden><abstract>Philosophers and linguists alike tend to call a semantic theory ‘Russellian’ just in case it assigns to sentences in which definite descriptions occur the truth-conditions Russell did in ‘On Denoting’. This is unfortunate; not all aspects of those particular truth-conditions do explanatory work in Russell's writings. As far as the semantics of descriptions is concerned, the key insights of ‘On Denoting’ are that definite descriptions are not uniformly referring expressions, and that they are scope-bearing elements. Anyone who accepts these two claims can account for Russell's puzzle cases the way he did. Russell had no substantive argument for the claim that ‘The F is G’ entails ‘There is at most one F’; in fact, he had important misgivings about it. I outline an argument against this claim, and I argue that by holding on to uniqueness contemporary semanticists make a momentous mistake: they keep the illusion alive that there is a way to account for linguistic meaning without addressing what linguistic expressions are for.</abstract><cop>Oxford</cop><pub>Oxford University Press</pub><doi>10.1093/mind/fzi1185</doi><tpages>38</tpages></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 0026-4423
ispartof Mind, 2005-10, Vol.114 (456), p.1185-1222
issn 0026-4423
1460-2113
language eng
recordid cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_85644890
source EBSCOhost MLA International Bibliography With Full Text; Oxford Journals Online; Linguistics and Language Behavior Abstracts (LLBA); JSTOR Archival Journals; Humanities Index
subjects Criticism
Definite articles
Definite descriptions
Epithets
Intuition
Linguistics
Logic
Logical form
Ordinary language philosophy
Philosophers
Philosophy
Phrases
Predicates
Russell, Bertrand Arthur William (1872-1970)
Semantics
Uniqueness
title The Loss of Uniqueness
url http://sfxeu10.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/loughborough?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-11T21%3A58%3A09IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=The%20Loss%20of%20Uniqueness&rft.jtitle=Mind&rft.au=Szabo,%20Zoltan%20Gendler&rft.date=2005-10-01&rft.volume=114&rft.issue=456&rft.spage=1185&rft.epage=1222&rft.pages=1185-1222&rft.issn=0026-4423&rft.eissn=1460-2113&rft.coden=MNDDAB&rft_id=info:doi/10.1093/mind/fzi1185&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E3840626%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Cgrp_id%3Ecdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c385t-4a6e794b8aee7addca1b1f3cfa8009ba798338ceda5facbbddcfc5ba5c7f56f53%3C/grp_id%3E%3Coa%3E%3C/oa%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=228601289&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=3840626&rfr_iscdi=true