Property Attribution in Metaphor Comprehension

• Published in: Journal of memory and language 1997-01, Vol.36 (1), p.50-67
• Main Authors: Glucksberg, Sam, McGlone, Matthew S., Manfredi, Deanna
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Biological and medical sciences; Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology; Language; Metaphor; Miscellaneous; Psychology; Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry; Psychology. Psychophysiology
• ISSN: 0749-596X; 1096-0821
• DOI: 10.1006/jmla.1996.2479

Metaphors of the formX is a Ymay be conceived as statements of property attribution, in which properties of the vehicleYare attributed to the topicX. The properties attributed from the vehicle to the topic are those that are epitomized by the vehicle, and may characterize a dimension of within-category variation in the topic. We report two experiments that tested the implications of this “property attribution” view of metaphor comprehension. One implication of this view is that metaphors are not implicitly transformed into comparisons (X is like a Y), but rather are understood as what they appear to be: class-inclusion assertions. If metaphors are understood as class-inclusion assertions, they should either change meaning or become nonsensical when reversed. Experiment 1 provides evidence for this claim. A second implication of the property attribution view is that topics and vehicles provide different kinds of information to guide and constrain the comprehension process. Experiment 2 provides evidence for this claim. These findings cannot be accounted for by models which assume that metaphors are understood as implicit comparisons.