Environmental Crime and Punishment: Empirical Evidence from the German Penal Code

U.S. and E. U. environmental policy employ criminal sanctions to enforce compliance. Recent moves toward revising their use are based on little empirical evidence as to their effectiveness. This paper exploits a unique dataset to study the deterrent effect of criminal enforcement. The dynamic panel...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Land economics 2010-11, Vol.86 (4), p.707-726
Main Authors: Almer, Christian, Goeschl, Timo
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Climate change
Crime
Crime reporting
Criminal prosecution
Criminal sanctions
Criminals
Economic regulation
Empirical evidence
Environmental crimes
Environmental economics
Environmental law
Environmental management
Environmental policy
Environmental regulation
European Union
Germany
Industrial pollution
Law enforcement
Legal codes
Legal status, laws, etc
Legislation
Police
Political economy
Pollution control
Prisons
Studies
United States
Western Europe
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Description
Summary:U.S. and E. U. environmental policy employ criminal sanctions to enforce compliance. Recent moves toward revising their use are based on little empirical evidence as to their effectiveness. This paper exploits a unique dataset to study the deterrent effect of criminal enforcement. The dynamic panel data analysis leads to three findings. First, criminal sanctions do provide the intended deterrent effects. Second, standing trial provides one of the most significant deterrents, rather than the probability of conviction or the magnitude of fines. Third, public preferences regarding environmental quality and political economy variables affect reported environmental crime.
ISSN:0023-7639
1543-8325
DOI:10.3368/le.86.4.707